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NEW FACES AND NEW MASKS OF TODAY'S CONSUMER 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ten years ago, we proposed that consumption and contemporary consumerism 
could not be studied or understood separately from the world of work and 
production. We proposed that contemporary consumerism was built on the back 
of what we referred to as ‘the Fordist Deal’ {Gabriel, 1995 #62}. This deal, 
pioneered by Henry Ford for his employees, was the promise of ever increasing 
standards of living in exchange for a quiescent labour force accepting alienating 
work. Ford offered his workforce the carrot of material enjoyment outside the 
workplace as compensation for the deskilling, control and alienation that he 
imposed in the workplace. He also recognized the potential of his workers as 
customers, once they rose above mere subsistence. Since that deal was struck, 
consumerism came to signify a general pre-occupation with consumption 
standards and choice as well as a willingness to read meanings in material 
commodities and to equate happiness and success with material possessions. In 
this sense, Ford may be seen as the father both of mass production and mass 
consumption. Since the Fordist high noon of consumerism in the West, mass 
consumption is widely seen as having fragmented into a proliferation of highly 
individualized niche products. For its part, a considerable part of mass production 
has migrated to countries with lower wages and looser environmental and social 
controls, fueling their own variants of consumerism. In this paper, we examine 
the gradual erosion of the Fordist Deal in the light of developments in the last ten 
years or so, seeking to assess the future of consumerism at a global level. We 
also seek to identify and discuss some emerging conceptualizations of the 
consumer, some of the new faces and masks assumed by the archetypal 
character of our types. We analyse some of the tensions and contradictions 
lurking behind these conceptualizations and try to envisage some of the real 
choices facing consumers today and some of the processes of social change 
that hinge on the outcomes of these choices. 
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NEW FACES AND NEW MASKS OF TODAY'S CONSUMER1 
 
 
In the last ten or twenty years, the consumer has become the focus of extensive 
debates in many human sciences, including economics, sociology, psychology, 
cultural studies and so forth. Everywhere it seems, the consumer is triumphant. 
Consumers are said to dictate production; to fuel innovation; to be creating new 
service sectors in advanced economies; to be driving modern politics; to have it 
in their power to save the environment and protect the future of the planet. 
Consumers embody a simple modern logic, the right to choose. Choice,  the 
consumer's friend, the inefficient producer's foe,  can be applied to things as 
diverse as soap-powder, holidays, healthcare or politicians. And yet the 
consumer is also seen as a weak and malleable creature, easily manipulated, 
dependent, passive and foolish. Immersed in illusions, addicted to joyless 
pursuits and in spite of ever-increasing living standards, the consumer, far from 
being god, is a pawn, in games played in invisible boardrooms.  
 
The consumer also sits at the centre of numerous policy debates. Policy-makers, 
marketers, politicians, environmentalists, lobbyists and journalists rarely lose the 
consumer from their sights. The supermarket has become a metaphor for our 
age; choice, its consumerist mantra. A new way of thinking and talking about 
people has emerged, which engulfs  all of us, one ardently embraced by the 
mass media. By the beginning of the 21st century, we have learnt to talk and 
think of each other and of ourselves less as workers, citizens, parents or 
teachers, and more as consumers. Our rights and our powers derive from our 
standing as consumers; our political choices are votes for those promising us the 
best deal as consumers; our enjoyment of life is almost synonymous with the 
quantities (and to a lesser extent qualities) of what we consume.  Our success is 
measured in terms of how well we are doing as consumers.  Consumption is not 
just a means of fulfilling needs but permeates our social relations, identities, 
perceptions and images. 
 
Ten years ago, we proposed that consumption and contemporary consumerism 
could not be studied or understood separately from the world of work and 
production. We proposed that contemporary consumerism was built on the back 
of what we referred to as ‘the Fordist Deal’ {Gabriel, 1995 #62}. This deal, 
pioneered by Henry Ford for his employees, was the promise of ever increasing 
standards of living in exchange for a quiescent labour force accepting alienating 
work. Ford offered his workforce the carrot of material enjoyment outside the 
workplace as compensation for the deskilling, control and alienation that he 
imposed in the workplace. He also recognized the potential of his workers as 
customers, once they rose above mere subsistence. "If you cut wages, you just 
cut the number of your customers" {Barnet, 1994 #589, p. 261}.  Of course, the 
deal assumed different forms in different industries and different countries – 
                                            
1
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more extreme in the US, extreme in countries with long traditions of social 
democracy. The deal was also resisted, actively and passively, by many groups 
of workers in different contexts. What is remarkable, however, is that in spite of 
variations in the way the Fordist Deal was implemented, consumerism as a 
general pre-occupation with consumption standards and choice established itself 
as a dominant outlook throughout the 20th century in many countries and 
continues to do so today. Consumerism entails a willingness to read meanings in 
material commodities and to equate happiness and success with material 
possessions {Lebergott, 1993 #7}. In this sense, Ford may be seen as the father 
both of mass production and mass consumption. He is often credited with being 
the father of the former, but rarely of the latter. 
 
The last ten years have seen extraordinary social and economic changes that 
have reframed the nature of consumption world-wide {Trentmann, 2005 #1050}. 
The emergence of China, India and other developing countries as huge 
consumer markets and producer hotspots has extended the reach of 
contemporary consumerism. Political realignments world-wide have spawned 
new outposts of consumption and new black holes of deprivation while 
generalized uncertainty has tempered some consumers’ appetites. Major 
technological innovations, notably the internet, have turned many homes into 
retail outposts while digital photography and MP3 players have revolutionized 
patterns of consuming images and music. Education and health provisions have 
become yet more commodified, with students and patients viewing themselves 
as consumers. At the same time, anti-globalization movements with an anti-
consumption message have, at times, assumed centre-stage of politics, offering 
at least a glimpse of opposition to mainstream consumer capitalism. Islamist 
ideology has made much of the decadence and spiritual impoverishment of 
materialist West. Overall, the last ten years have seen a substantial expansion of 
consumerism into new areas, countries and homes, and an escalation of 
potential checks from environmental and political uncertainties. Everywhere the 
core value of consumerism – choice – is apparent {Levett, 2003 #608; Levett, 
2003 #608}. 
 
In the same period, academic writing on consumption and the accompanying 
fetishization of the consumer has sky-rocketed in new consumer-oriented 
journals and books. Cultural studies have dissected shopping malls as 
cathedrals of consumption and students of organization have focused on the 
limits of the ethos of customer service. Identity construction has come to be 
viewed increasingly through the prism of lifestyles. Choice, modelled on the 
affluent consumer  experience, has become the central tenet of many political 
and ethical discourses. At the same time, there is an increasing awareness 
among some academics of the ecological limits to the consumerist orgy, which 
are already alarming observers of climate change, raw materials and natural 
resources such as soil, water and air.  In addition, there is the continuing sore of 
billions of people subsisting at a level of bare survival. And finally, the 
expectation of steady, well-paid, even if alienating jobs has become unrealistic 
for ever increasing numbers of people in industrialized and industrializing 
countries. 
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Mass consumption is now widely seen as having fragmented into a proliferation 
of highly individualized niche products. For its part, a considerable part of mass 
production has migrated to countries with lower wages and looser environmental 
and social controls, fueling their own variants of consumerism. In this paper, we 
examine the gradual erosion of the Fordist Deal in the light of developments in 
the last ten years or so, seeking to assess the future of consumerism at a global 
level. We consider some of the social factors that have contributed to this 
erosion, notably casualization of work, demographic trends leading to aging 
populations in the industrialized countries, new consumption patterns deriving 
from technological innovations and the emergence of a new politics of identity 
diluting long-established class-based politics. We examine how relations 
between production and consumption have been affected by globalization and 
the emergence of an informational capitalism where much of what is produced 
and traded assumes non-material forms. We acknowledge the current 
importance of narrative knowledge in a society saturated by information and 
explore how this type of knowledge contained in stories and personal 
experiences influences the actions and choices of consumers. We argue, 
however, that the main currency of informational capitalism is not narrative but 
image. Using some of the arguments of Ritzer, Bauman and others, we argue 
that image fundamentally alters both work and consumption experiences, leading 
to a highlighting of aesthetic values and a dislocation of conventional 
considerations of value and service. Appearance and emotional tone become 
central. The paper concludes by identifying a fundamental paradox between the 
ubiquity of the consumer in contemporary discourses and the virtual impossibility 
to generalize about consumers. We suggest then that the consumer may be 
viewed as one of those ‘essentially contested concepts’ proposed by Gallie {, 
1964 #1057} that defy domestication. The consumer, we argue, is 
unmanageable, both as a concept, since no-one can pin it down to one specific 
conceptualization at the expense of all others, and as an entity, since attempts to 
control and manage the consumer lead to the consumer mutating from one 
impersonation to another. It is precisely this paradox that we seek to capture in 
our paper’s title.   
 
Our paper concludes with a consideration of three fundamental challenges that 
are liable to lead to fundamental reorientation of consumption, production as well 
as of our conceptualizations and theorizing about them. These challenges are 
the outcomes of environmental, demographic and social factors, that, we argue, 
make the current situation unsustainable and will bring about its dissolution.  
 
THE FORDIST DEAL AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
The Fordist Deal is currently unravelling under pressure from multiple directions 
which affect production as deeply as consumption. New technologies enable the 
easy relocation of jobs and transfer of information, resulting in a wide-ranging 
restructuring of the international division of labour – who makes what, where and 
how. The concept of a ‘job for life’ in much of the industrialized West, to say 
nothing of the formerly centrally planned economies of the Communist block 
have virtually lost meaning {Sennett, 1998 #110; Gabriel, 2005 #242}. Instead, 
many jobs have become casualized and careers have become fragmented -- 
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rapid job moves, being constantly on the look-out for better opportunities and 
work prospects; frenetic periods of work on specific projects followed by almost 
certain periods of self-employment or under-employment {Bunting, 2004 #584; 
Heery, 2000 #1061}. Casualization does not necessarily mean unemployment; 
on the contrary, it implies impermanence in work as the new benchmark. Indeed, 
vast new opportunities of employment have been created in the service sectors, 
involving either the manipulation of symbols on screens and the clicking of 
computer mice, or alternatively front line work with customers in hospitality, 
entertainment, retail, sport and tourist sectors. In many of them, emotional and 
aesthetic labour have assumed major importance, accounting for much of the 
consumption experience {Ashforth, 1993 #245; Korczynski, 2001 #534; 
Korczynski, 2003 #536; Ritzer, 1998 #543; Hancock, 2000 #1052; Tyler, 1998 
#1054; Warhurst, 2000 #1055; Witz, 2003 #1056}.  
 
The Fordist Deal is also unravelling as a result of deep-rooted changes in 
consumption patterns. In most countries, consumers are becoming younger; and, 
due to demographic pressures and healthcare, they are becoming older. The 
reach of the Fordist Deal is weakened by this demographic cultural shift. New 
areas of consumption, such as education, health (including fertility and voluntary 
euthanasia), the voluntary and not-for-profit sector and transport, are rapidly 
being colonized by a consumer ethos of choice and identity politics. New parts of 
the world are seized by the excitement of consumerism. New forms of resistance 
are making themselves felt, ranging from music piracy, to anti-globalization and 
environmental protests, from fundamentalist and militant religious resurgence to 
economic downshifting and career moratoriums. New vulnerabilities such as 
internet crime and identity theft are added to enduring old ones, like terrorism 
and fraud. Consumerism may absorb or co-opt some of these challenges though 
in the longer run, the challenges posed by ecological and demographic factors 
leave no doubt about troubled times ahead or even coming crises.  
 
If the comfortable co-habitation of mass consumption and mass production that 
characterized the Fordist Deal appears to be coming to an end, production and 
consumption continue to be tied together, neither determining the other but in 
constant and mutual definition. The original tight linkage between production and 
consumption is not necessarily lost, but certainly weakened. Understanding 
consumption still requires that we understand production and understanding 
production requires that we understand consumption. This is not a new insight. A 
century and a half ago, Marx was keenly aware that production and consumption 
cannot be separated: "Without production, no consumption; but also, without 
consumption, no production"  {Marx, 1859/1993 #241}. Every form of production 
involves the consumption of resources and every type of consumption results in 
some production, even if only waste. But, consumption is also work – it requires 
patient or breathless searches through high-streets, shopping malls or internet 
sites; it involves minuscule comparisons and painstaking choices; it demands 
continuous updating and vigilance. Some consumption, such as working out in a 
gym or reading a book is almost just work.  By the same token, a great deal of 
consumption, including corporate hospitality and corporate travel, takes place 
while we are notionally at work.  
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Part of what ties consumption and production together is the new politics of 
meaning and identity {Du Gay, 1996 #22}. Meaning and identity are not 
fashioned solely in the realm of consumption as some theorists of postmodernity 
have argued, but emerge through what is referred to as lifestyle choices – 
loosely connected sets of tastes, behaviours, ideas and values {Chaney, 1996 
#159; Gershuny, 1988 #627; Chaney, 1996 #159}. These lifestyles may entail 
coherence in work, leisure and home, or may entail dissonances and 
discontinuities. The holiday, that lifestyle emblem, may complement work, home 
and income or, equally, may be extravagantly out tune with them. Under the 
regime of the Fordist Deal, identity and meaning were tied to one’s work and 
one’s living standards as enabled by their working situation, themselves the 
product of class position {Sennett, 1998 #110}. Today, by contrast, identity and 
meaning are more fluid, tentative and inconsistent – choice has made such 
inconsistencies possible. 
 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
If Henry Ford’s assembly lines represented the kernel of the Fordist Deal, today’s 
interdependence of consumption and production may best be observed in the 
call centre {Sturdy, 2001 #551; Korczynski, 2001 #535; Korczynski, 2003 #536; 
Frenkel, 1999 #609}, late modernity’s answer to those satanic mills of early 
industrialization. In the Indian call-centre servicing customers in Toronto and 
Manchester at all times of day and night, we find many of the contemporary 
global interconnections between production and consumption. The consumer, 
that reputed sovereign, stuck to her telephone in New York, cursing the 
umpteenth return of Vivaldi’s Four Seasons while being put on hold, waiting to 
buy her railway ticket to the suburbs through a busy call-centre located 
somewhere in Bangalore. And the worker at the call centre, a member of the 
local consumer aristocracy in her own right, servicing a global clientele, caught 
between a relentless pressure for ‘orders taken’ and a much drummed 
requirement to offer a quality, personalized service with the telephone equivalent 
of a smile.  
 
A closer look at the inter-relations of production and consumption, however, 
suggests that the call centre falls short of embodying all the complexities of this 
relationship. While some of what is traded today is still goods and services, an 
increasing proportion is information itself. This lies at the heart of what Castells 
memorably called the new ‘informational capitalism’ {Castells, 1996 #597; 
Castells, 1997 #428; Castells, 1998 #598}; the productivity and competitiveness 
of different economic units, such as firms, countries or trading networks lies in 
their ability to handle, process and manage information and knowledge. Crucial 
for this capitalism is the free flow of information across networks of economic 
agents, a flexible workforce, capable of working around the clock, when and as 
required. The very concept of a job, argues Castells and others, is replaced by 
what he terms self-programmable labour, in which the stock of knowledge and 
information in the minds of workers is constantly expanded and modified 
throughout their working lives. Work, then, becomes tantamount to learning or 
more specifically learning how to learn or being prepared to learn. In an economy 
changing at Internet speed, specific information and knowledge becomes 
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obsolete in a few years, a few months or even a few days. What becomes 
essential is the ability to transform generic information into specific knowledge to 
be applied in concrete situations {Castells, 2001 #670, p. 90} and always ready 
to engage with and understand the new.  
 
When thinking of information, most commentators envisage reams of 
spreadsheets, astronomical sequences of digitized figures on computer 
memories, in short, data on every conceivable detail of social, personal and 
economic life. Undoubtedly, we live in a society drowning in such information, a 
society in which the ability to navigate in shortcuts, around the endless detours of 
mostly useless information, accords individuals, organizations and networks 
considerable power. Some authors {Brown, 1994 #674; Orr, 1996 #393; 
Gherardi, 1998 #675; Wenger, 1998 #434; Wenger, 2000 #676; Tsoukas, 2002 
#672} have sought to defend narrative knowledge, the knowledge stored in 
stories, anecdotes and narratives as precisely such shortcutting knowledge, 
knowledge developed and shared creatively by what are currently referred to as 
‘communities of practice’. Whether a medical practitioner, an advertising 
executive, an airline pilot, a stockbroker, a midwife or a traveling salesperson, 
you realize that some of the most valuable is not contained in books, manuals 
and computer programmes of your trade but in the stories and narratives you 
exchange informally with people on your wave-length, people who share your 
assumptions, interests and problems {Gabriel, 2000 #679; Gabriel, 2002 #153}. 
A telling story may shortcut through swathes of information, supplying the idea 
behind a quick, relevant and appropriate solution. 
 
Narrative knowledge can also supply much of value to consumers of all kinds of 
products and services. The experience of those who had plastic surgery in a 
particular clinic, the stories they tell about the staff, the pain endured and the 
eventual success of their treatment may be decisive in whether a potential 
customer decides to avail of the clinic’s service, or indeed to have the treatment 
at all. The stories of owners or users of particular objects, ranging from books, 
music, mobile telephony, and so forth can now be easily found in the internet. 
Amazon, apart from everything else, offers a prospective customer a wonderful 
opportunity to sample what he or she is about to purchase and also to read the 
stories of those who have purchased it before. In this sense, at least, the internet 
has created a type of knowledge that is quite distinct from the ones and zeroes 
on those spreadsheets. It has led to some consumer empowerment – consumers 
swap stories about goods and services they purchased and are in a position to 
make more meaningful, if not better ‘informed’ choices. 
 
SOCIETY OF IMAGE? 
 
Arguably more important than narrative in our society is image. Image would 
appear to be the main currency of informational capitalism. Ours is more a 
society of visual representations, images, spectacles and shows. Our daily 
universe has become saturated with images, jumping at us from our television 
sets, our magazines and newspapers, our computer screens and our digital 
cameras, advertising billboards and shop windows. We are bombarded by 
PowerPoint presentations, a template of presenting ideas that marginalizes finely 
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turned arguments and analysis. As image replaces words, pithiness replaces 
subtlety. Shops and malls, the cathedrals of consumption, are minutely 
engineered mega-shows, to stimulate and delight the eye, to whet appetites and 
to excite emotions. Saturated by images, most of us have given up trying to fit 
them into stories and have learnt to accept them as spectacle pure and simple, 
pleasing or annoying, evoking, prompting, comforting, upsetting, entertaining or 
irritating.  
 
The idea that we live in an era saturated by spectacle where image reigns 
supreme is of course not new. Parodying Marx, Guy Debord opened his 1960s 
situationist manifesto with:  
 
“In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all life 
presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything 
that was directly lived has moved away into representation." {Debord, 
1977 #177, paragraph 1} 
 
Allowing for the obvious hyperbole, Debord’s premise seems to be even more 
powerful today than in the 1960s when he made it the basis of his then fringe 
and latterly more fashionable if edgy critique {Debord, 1977 #177}. Numerous 
theorists, including Bauman, Ritzer and Baudrillard, have since argued that 
spectacle has become the primary type of experience in late modernity, 
dominating every aspect of our public and private lives. Spectacle liquefies most 
forms of social exchange, colonizing politics, sport, religion and education. The 
society of spectacle probably reaches its apotheosis in the Olympics, a truly 
global brand which lands on earth every four years.  What has changed since the 
situationist critique is the more nuanced evaluation that we accord spectacle 
today, the less unequivocal equation of spectacle with passivity and stupefaction. 
Thus, inspired by Bauman, Ritzer {, 1999 #90} has argued that spectacle has led 
to a re-enchantment of the world in late modernity’s cathedrals of consumption. 
Shopping malls, glass buildings, tourist resorts, sports venues and theme parks, 
are all minutely planned and orchestrated shows, with spectators themselves 
becoming part of the display. Immense amounts of money are spent in 
advertising and packaging, films and television shows, magazines and printed 
images. Politics, education, sport, religion, charity, journalism, to say nothing of 
the entertainment and leisure sectors become dominated by spectacle. 
Spectacle becomes the archetypal experience of our time, they argue, offering 
“the promise of new, overwhelming, mind-boggling or spine-chilling, but always 
exhilarating experience” {Bauman, 1997 #157, p. 181}.   
 
According to this view, we are now deep in the era of spectacle. It is estimated 
that in 2004 28 billion digital pictures were taken in the US alone. The figure is 
likely to continue rising exponentially as life gets lived as a series of photo-
opportunities and consumption becomes substantially a consumption of images 
or a consumption for the benefit of generating images. The media are 
themselves inviting the public to amplify this process by submitting their own 
digital images of events ranging from pop festivals to tsunamis and from 
everyday crime to terrorist outrages. The media themselves produce a constant 
sequence of images which create, as Boorstin {, 1962 #485} understood before 
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Debord or Baudrillard, illusions of reality, swamping us with images and pictures. 
Our consciousness is now saturated with image and our memories are to a large 
extent visual ones. As Susan Sontag put it succinctly, following the publication of 
the horrendous images of prisoner abuse from the Abu Ghraib prison camp in 
Iraq: 
 
The memory museum is now mostly a visual one. Photographs have 
an insuperable power to determine what people recall of events. … To 
live is to be photographed, to have a record of one’s life, and 
therefore, to go on with one’s life, oblivious, or claiming to be 
oblivious, to the camera’s non-stop attentions. But it is also to pose. 
To act is to share in the community of actions recorded as images. … 
Events are in part designed to be photographed . {Sontag, 2004 #806} 
 
Under the regime of the Fordist Deal, automobiles symbolized the link between 
production and consumption. The product of hard manual labour, the automobile 
captured the aspirations of the affluent working classes, promising, freedom, 
mobility, speed, style and comfort. By contrast, in a society dominated by image, 
labour assumes aesthetic and emotional qualities, previously only available to 
the super-rich. Looking smart and sounding right are qualities every bit as 
important in getting a job in the new service economy, over and above physical 
strength or formal qualifications and cognitive competences. The notion of 
emotional intelligence has emerged as the way of capturing and commodifying 
these aptitudes {Fineman, 2000 #808; Goleman, 1996 #807}.  
 
If image, including the employees’ looks, the buildings, clothes, logos, and 
atmosphere, now permeates production, it totally saturates consumption. The 
most mundane or innocuous object or service can be beautified to make it an 
object of desire. The aestheticisation of every day life, as epitomized by Italy’s 
love affair with style (bello stile), becomes an end in itself {Featherstone, 1992 
#809; Calinescu, 1987 #810; Postrel, 2003 #1060}. Price and costings 
incorporate this new ‘take’ on what is meant by value. 
 
UNMANAGEABILITY AND THE CONSUMER 
 
Alongside the emergence of this society of image, older and starker 
characteristics still remain. Inequalities among consumers are already sharp, 
leaving substantial numbers of them window-shopping with only restricted 
opportunities to make a purchase and many, in the developing countries, without 
even windows to window-shop. This is contributing to the fragmentation of 
consumers' experiences. While some consumers throughout the world may 
spend inordinate amounts of time deliberating whether to invest in a new 
swimming-pool, a new car or a second home abroad, others have to choose 
between feeding their children or buying them a new pair of shoes. Those 
inequalities occur within not just between societies. Given such social chasms, it 
is difficult to talk about all consumption and all consumers as coming under the 
same ethos or constraints, i.e. as being uniform entities or acting as a unified 
force. The fragmentation of images of consumption is itself a symptom of the 
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malaise of contemporary consumerism and a fragmentation of the concept of the 
consumer.  
 
In 1995, The Unmanageable Consumer argued that the Fordist Deal was 
weakening and suggested that Western consumerism may have entered a 
twilight phase. During the high noon of consumerism in the latter half of the 20th 
century, we argued, the face of the consumer was clear, as was the significance 
of his or her every movement. The pursuit of happiness through consumption 
seemed a plausible, if morally questionable, social and personal project.  Today, 
that analysis is inadequate. The economic conditions have become more 
fraught, the social inequalities have widened further, insecurity is experienced on 
a massive scale. Cultural fatigue threatens to overcome even the well-off, raising 
questions of pursuing simpler lives and spiritual and community values. The 
Fordist Deal can no longer promise happiness; it may be on the way to becoming 
a museum piece, pushed from its once iconic status by new cultural awareness, 
certainly by economic restructuring  {Layard, 2005 #1038}. 
 
When we surveyed the consumption landscape ten years ago, we were unsure 
about the future of consumerism and we felt that it was open. In the intervening 
period, the implications of several factors have become more salient. Key among 
them are the continuing expansion of consumerism to different parts of the globe 
and different areas of social life; the increasing domination of image and 
spectacle; the pursuit of meaning through consumption; enduring global 
inequalities; emerging new forms of activism and resistance; and continuing 
casualization of work and consumption.  
 
It is now clear that casualization of work is accompanied by casualization of 
consumption. People lead precarious and uneven existences, one day enjoying 
unexpected boons and the next feeling overwhelmed by insecurity and debt. 
Precariousness, unevenness and fragmentation will continue to characterize 
Western life prospects. Marginality has paradoxically become central. The notion 
of an average consumer has become a fiction. In a world where everyone claims 
the consumer for her or himself, the consumer must now be deemed 
unmanageable, claimed by many, but controlled by nobody, least of all by 
consumers themselves.  In a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society in 1956, 
the philosopher Walter Bryce Gallie {, 1964 #1057} argued that certain concepts 
defy domestication within particular discourse or traditions; they acquire many 
diverse meanings depending on who uses them and in what context. Such, he 
argued, was the fate of words like ‘art’ or ‘fairness’. These, he termed ‘essentially 
contested concepts’ in order to facilitate an understanding of different 
applications or interpretations, without seeking to adjudicate between ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ usages.  Essentially contested concepts cannot be controlled or 
managed. This, it seems to us, is exactly what has happened to the term 
‘consumer’ – it has become an essentially contested concept. The consumer, 
then, is unmanageable, both as a concept, since no-one can pin it down to one 
specific conceptualization at the expense of all others, and as an entity, since 
attempts to control and manage the consumer result in a mutation from a stable 
consumer concept to an unstable one.  
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The notion of unmanageability seems to us to be entirely appropriate for an era 
where the capacity to plan must give way to opportunism, living for the present. 
Deeming the consumers to be unmanageable does not mean that vast resources 
are not expended in seeking to control them, cajole them, predict and mould their 
behaviour and consciousness. Vast amounts of information is collected at the 
point of sale, the point of thinking about a purchase, in order to make consumers 
appear predictable and amenable to typologies of marketing efforts. And yet, the 
best attempts at managing consumers easily comes undone, as when a fad or a 
fashion seizes their imagination and, just as quickly, goes. Even as they are 
constantly typecast and pigeon-holed, consumers are becoming more 
unmanageable, eccentric and paradoxical.  
 
The argument then is that, like today’s producers, today’s consumers (after all, 
even in a globalized division of labour they are often the same people) must rely 
on opportunism, and seeking to be in the right place at the right times. As 
Bauman has argued,  
 
"In the life-game of the postmodern consumers the rules of the game 
keep changing in the course of playing. The sensible strategy is 
therefore to keep each game short -- so that a sensibly played game 
of life calls for the splitting of one big all-embracing game with huge 
stakes into a series of brief and narrow games with small ones. ... To 
keep the game short means to beware long-term commitments. To 
refuse to be 'fixed' one way or the other. Not to get tied to the place. 
Not to wed one's life to one vocation only. Not to swear consistency 
and loyalty to anything and anybody. Not to control the future, but to 
refuse to mortgage it: to take care that the consequences of the game 
do not outlive the past to bear on the present." {Bauman, 1996 #112, 
p. 24} 
 
To retailers and producers of goods and services, this unmanageability may not 
be a terminal difficulty and for some, it may represent an opportunity. So long as 
a certain proportion of the population at any one time is in a position to spend, 
there will be markets, and entrepreneurs will discover opportunities to capitalize 
on people’s desire to celebrate and enjoy themselves. After all, the opportunism 
of consumers is matched by the opportunism of business. To other consumers, 
however, a future based on mortgages, careful husbanding of resources and 
long-term financial commitments could become routine. Within someone’s life, 
periods of both of these experiences are likely to feature, periods of both feast 
and famine. 
 
Market researchers and the agents of production endlessly pursue the Holy Grail 
of control, seeking to anticipate consumer trends on behalf of capital, which 
stands to gain massively from accurate predictions, coupled with investment in 
attempts to shape or tempt consumption to its benefit.  The task of those who 
seek to anticipate trends is inevitably partisan, their goal to mould the future to 
their ends.  
 
 13 
But planning a future for the consumer is one thing, delivering it is another.  Even 
at the mundane level of anticipating what objects will be popular in the future, 
prognostication is fraught with danger. The history of consumption is full of dead-
ends. Products that pundits were once sure would become objects of mass 
consumption and desire in the future now stand as quaint reminders of the 
pitfalls of futurology.  In the 1960s, for instance, the merchants of tomorrow's 
world were offering us throw-away paper clothes, holidays on the moon, living in 
geodesic domes, eating food in tablet form, undertaking less work.  In practice 
today, precious few houses are in dome form; there has been a meteoric rise in 
nutritional supplements but only in addition to more 'ordinary' food; no-one has 
been to the moon almost since the first landings; mountains of paper are thrown 
away – despite the age of the electronic office once promised paperlessness - 
but not having been worn on human bodies; and people who are in work often 
work harder and longer.  The future of the 1960s failed to materialize, in more 
senses than one. Equally, we suspect, the future as envisaged by today's brave 
prognosticators has more to do with their own fantasies and wishes than future 
facts.  
 
There is a disparity, however, between the fantasies of industrialists and retailers 
and those of consumers themselves. The former ever dream of managing 
consumers, while the latter's dreams make them ever unmanageable. The 
former seek to put their vision into practice; the latter subvert, refuse, accept, 
interpret, surrender or embrace. Consumers have proven that in spite of the best 
efforts to constrain, control and manipulate them, they can act in ways which are 
unpredictable, inconsistent and contrary. 
 
THE FUTURE(S) 
 
If, as we have just argued, on the one hand, unpredictability, inconsistency and 
contrariness all characterize today’s consumption, on the other hand, 
governments persist in their policy of “business as usual”, by which well-being is 
equated to ever-higher national income and higher spending power. Public 
discourses are dominated by the discipline of economic, economic forecasts and 
narrow conceptions of value and utility. Faith in the market as the mechanism 
that will deliver this higher standard of living is undiminished in the world’s power  
elite (expressed in G8, Davos and International Chamber of Commerce 
communiqués), even if it is being more openly contested by some critics and 
some oppositional movements (exemplified by global movements pushing for fair 
trade or poverty elimination). An increasing number of voices is heard arguing 
that environmental, demographic and social factors will combine in the longer 
term to undermine this conception of well-being as increased wealth. GDP, they 
cry, is no longer the right indicator of progress in an era where the challenge to 
meet planetary sustainability looms large. 
 
The environmental challenge to consumerism is now clear to almost all thinking 
people. The evidence is very strong for coming shortages of key resources that 
have underpinned the consumerist expansion of the 20th century. These include 
oil, water, land, soil, clean air and minerals {Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(Program), 2005 #1013; Lang, 2004 #580}. Without these, even an information-
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based economy cannot be delivered and some forward-thinking companies are 
preparing exit strategies or technical fixes to leave the present mode of 
production and to experiment with alternative modes. The success of such 
strategies should not be relied upon; nor should they be dismissed out of hand. 
Even tougher environmental challenges are already apparent. The most 
significant of these is undoubtedly climate change which heralds dramatic 
discontinuities and ruptures in current form of consumption. Pollution, waste and 
desertification are also looming. 
 
The demographic challenge is likely to prove as severe and politically unsettling. 
The world population passed 6 billion at the beginning of the 21st century, and is 
predicted by the UN Population Fund to rise to 9-10 billion by 2050. Feeding, 
housing and providing water for such escalating demands would be awesome 
enough across centuries. But these problems will be exacerbated by the 
environmental problems noted above and by the demographic disequilibria 
created by aging populations of most industrialized countries, along side the 
youthfulness of other countries. The combination of environmental and 
demographic factors have led some pessimistic theorists to speculate that social 
unrest, disease and warfare, will reach unprecedented scale in the longer term. 
Optimists, on the other hand, argue that, as ever, the problem is not absolute 
numbers of people and production, but relative inequalities and distribution of 
public goods within and across those populations.  
 
In the last resort, however, even environmental and demographic factors are 
mediated by social and cultural forces. It is people, after all, who consume, 
people who aspire and people who can make a difference. There is increasing 
evidence that decades of consumerism have not delivered unequivocal 
happiness and have created discontents of their own. Mental illness, family 
dislocation and the enduring social inequalities, are in themselves measures of 
the failure of consumerism to fulfil its promise of pleasure for all. Happiness, 
some people come to believe, is not a destination to travel towards, but a way of 
travelling. Speaking at the peak of the Fordist Deal in the USA, Robert F. 
Kennedy, then running for President and shortly before his assassination, 
captured the limitations of equating consumption as measured by GNP with 
social well-being in a speech at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas on 
March 18, 1968 
“For too long we seem to have surrendered personal excellence and 
community value in the mere accumulation of material things. Our 
gross national product now is over 800 billion dollars a year, but that 
gross national product, if we judge the United States of America by 
that, that gross national product counts air pollution, and cigarette 
advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It 
counts special locks for our doors and the jails for people who break 
them. It counts the destruction of the redwoods and the loss of our 
natural wonder in chaotic squall. It counts Napalm, and it counts 
nuclear warheads, and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in 
our city. It counts Whitman's rifles and Speck's Knifes and the 
television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our 
children. Yet, the gross national product does not allow for the health 
of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It 
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does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our 
marriages; the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our 
public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage; neither 
our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion nor our devotion 
to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which 
makes life worthwhile. […]"  
Forty years ago, a leading politician such as Robert Kennedy could see clearly 
the limits of consumerism for the richest consumer society in the world. Today, 
as the Fordist Deal unravels even as more nations are sucked into its legacy, 
leaving us with a far more fragile promise of happiness and a far greater burden 
for future generations, there are more people, across nations who have started 
to share his concerns and foreboding. It remains to be seen whether these 
concerns will find organized expression in new popular movements or in a 
political will to bring about genuine social change, or whether change to modern 
consumerist patterns will be shaken by external shocks to the system.  
 
Consumerism has a hidden infrastructure which, like icebergs, can be greater 
below the surface than above. Serious candidates for this role over coming years 
include: energy crises,(ADD: LEGGETT 2005) climate change, (ADD: STERN 
2005), geo-political instability, (ADD: FERGUSON 2006) and what the IMF has 
called “the disorderly unwinding of global [financial] imbalances”, (ADD: REF IMF 
2006). And the unsustainable levels of wasted ‘embedded water’ in consumer 
products,(ADD: ZYGMUNT 2007). It is not without reason that think-tanks and 
forecasters on climate change, to take just one of the above, are now troubled by 
the seeming intransigence of governments, industry and consumers to change 
policy and behaviour despite evidence to do so (IPCC 2007). They see the reefs 
ahead, but the consumerist ship ploughs on, secure that it is unsinkable.  
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